This paper attempts three tasks in relation to Carter and Leslie's Doomsday Argument. First, it criticises Timothy Chambers' 'Ussherian Corollary', a striking but unsuccessful objection to standard Doomsday arguments. Second, it reformulates the Ussherian Corollary as an objection to Bradley Monton's variant Doomsday and Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument. Finally, it tries to diagnose the epistemic/metaphysical problems facing Doomsday-related arguments.
Bayesian reasoning to hypotheses about the total human population, conditional on our approximate birth-rank in history. Estimates of past population suggest that contemporary humans have birth-ranks around sixty billion. Considering ourselves as random humans, our living now is fairly unremarkable if extinction looms but we are very unusual humans if humanity keeps growing. If the all-time human total proves to be (e.g.) six trillion, then less than 1% of humans will have had birth-ranks below sixty billion. However, if Doom occurs tomorrow, almost all human birthranks will be below ours. If humanity survives at or near its present level of population, our birth-ranks will quickly become unusually low. Our current location appears quite likely under the hypothesis of imminent extinction but looks rather less likely under hypotheses of long-term survival. If we should favour those hypotheses that make their explananda more likely rather than less, we should accordingly be inclined to favour the hypothesis of impending Doom.
Carter-Leslie DA is a subjectivist Bayesian argument, whose explanandum is our having the birth-ranks we do and whose explanans is a theory about future human population. DA tries to derive degrees of credence for our location, based on assumptions about the prior probabilities of certain population hypotheses and the likelihood these hypotheses bestow on our living hereabouts in history. DA probabilities reflect personal degrees of belief and not (e.g.) the limiting frequency with which species like ours die out. Before it can generate its conclusions, DA needs some assumptions about how to bestow prior probabilities on population-hypotheses and likelihoods on birth-ranks. Carter-Leslie DA usually uses a principle of indifference to generate prior probabilities, e.g. if you assume a maximal human population of x, give all population-hypotheses a prior of 1/x. Likewise, CarterLeslie DA normally gives each birth-rank a likelihood which is inversely proportional to the total population postulated, e.g. if you think the all-time human population will be 100 billion, your birth-rank should have a likelihood of 1/100 billion.
After , we can illustrate DA thus: your name is written on a slip of paper and placed in an urn. To keep things simple, let's only use two hypotheses about the urn, i.e. H1 = "the urn holds ten names" and H2 = "the urn holds . My 'Recent Work: The Doomsday Argument' (Philosophical Books, Vol. 47, 2006, pp. 129-42 ) offers a survey of DA, its forerunners and relatives. a thousand names". You give H1 and H2 prior probabilities of 0.05 and 0.95 respectively. Names are drawn from the urn, without replacement. Your name is drawn third. Should your name appearing so early affect your probabilities? Using Bayes' Theorem, plus the above prior and likelihood assumptions, transforms our prior of 0.05 into a posterior probability around 0.84. 3 If your name appears early, the urn probably holds few names. Likewise, your birth-rank confers higher conditional probability on the all-time human population being relatively small. If we should prefer explanations which confer greater conditional probability on our birth-ranks, we should assume that time will probably not add many more people to the human total, i.e. we should believe that humanity probably won't survive much longer.
DA variants are now legion. In an unusual counter to Carter-Leslie DA, Bradley Monton tries to reconstruct DA without birth-rank data. 4 Nick Bostrom's DA-related Simulation Argument says: if we are functionalists who think advanced civilisations will command much greater computing resources than ours, we should believe we're probably simulated minds. 5 Against such DA exotica, this paper deploys Timothy Chambers' anti-DA 'Ussherian Corollary'. 6 Chambers' argument may fail against traditional DA but it's an instructive failure which reveals much about DA's evidential basis and can still pose problems for Monton and Bostrom.
II) A Young Earth.
Timothy Chambers' 'Ussherian Corollary' (UC) is a striking parody of Doomsday reasoning, named after Bishop Ussher's 4,004 BC date for the Creation. Chambers (p. 446) says DA "entails a parallel Ussherian moral: that we have systematically underestimated the chance that the human race began fairly recently". Thus, DA favours recent Creation as much as Doom Soon, i.e. we are more likely to find ourselves living now if humanity is new rather than old. As Chambers thinks the Urn 3 P(H1e) = P(eH1) P(H1) = 0.1 × 0.05 ≈ 0.84 P(eH1)P(H1) + P(eH2) P(H2) (0.1 × 0.05) + (0.001 × 0.95) 4 'The Doomsday Argument Without Knowledge of Birth Rank ', The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, 2003, pp. 79-82. 5 'Are We Living in a Computer Simulation? ', The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, 2003, pp. 243-255. 6 'Do Doomsday's Proponents Think We Were Born Yesterday? ', Philosophy, Vol. 76, 2001, pp. 443-50. story is formally compatible with UC and DA, he maintains that anyone who finds UC unacceptable should also reject DA. However, even if we grant Chambers this formal parity, it doesn't follow that he has refuted DA. Five replies to UC follow.
Replies 1-4 are peripheral but #5 suggests a real disanalogy between DA and UC.
Reply 1: So what if DA and UC are symmetrical? We can all seem improbable relative to some set of descriptors, and probabilistic arguments often fail for someone in their reference class. (Somebody has to be the winner of even a billion-ticket fair lottery.) Maybe we can accept DA, but also conclude that we are simply unusual humans relative to UC's descriptors. However, if you refuse to be moved by apparent unlikelihoods of location, DA won't appeal to you anyway.
Reply 2: UC suggests the more recently history began, the likelier our location becomes. Thus, Chambers' parody doesn't support an Ussherian Corollary but a more radical Russellian one, e.g. the Earth began five minutes ago with six billion people already in situ. However, this reply suggests UC merely errs in putting Creation's date too long ago. A shorter past makes our present location likelier still.
Reply 3: Far from refuting DA, UC makes Doom more likely. If Ussher was right, Adam and Eve had at least six billion descendents in c. 6,000 years, implying steep and sustained population-growth. DA suggests that the steeper the population curve, the quicker our birth-ranks become unusual. (If this were a nanosecond-old 'Russellian' world, the rapid appearance of six billion people would mean a nearvertical population-curve. Our birth-ranks would be very early if this trend continued even for microseconds.) So, UC gives us more reason to accept DA. However this reply merely reinforces Chambers' alleged parity between UC and DA.
Reply 4: DA may seem to favour literal doom, (i.e. extinction) but it could equally suggest that our descendents evolve into something radically different from ourselves.
Likewise, UC may not favour recent Creation, as opposed to a recent cognitive breakthrough that puts contemporary humans in a different reference class from past ones. 7 However, we could equally 'explain' our present location on the hypothesis that all our predecessors were mindless hulks who went through life untroubled by consciousness. Such a 'Zombie' Corollary scarcely seems to improve on UC.
Reply 5: Replies 1-4 don't address the alleged parity between UC and DA. Even if UC and DA are formally symmetrical, their respective evidential bases are not. UC might threaten DA if DA ignored all population data and derived our likely future purely from the fact that we exist now. However, birth-rank data underpin DA as much as Bayes' Theorem does. In emphasising DA's formal properties and downplaying its evidential basis, Chambers risks depicting DA as an a priori argument or one for which evidential considerations are secondary. DA offers a scaling-factor for updating our probabilities. Any such argument can act only as a lever (or force-multiplier); it cannot dictate probabilities or credences on its own. We may think UC and DA formally symmetrical but find Doom Soon much more likely than recent Creation. If our probability for recent Creation is sufficiently low before invoking UC, it may still be low afterwards. 8 We could remove the evidential asymmetry between UC and DA, e.g. by discounting all evidence of our population-history. Observers who were equally uncertain about past and future might find DA and UC symmetrical evidentially as well as formally. However, even if DA and UC look similar from an evidential standpoint unlike ours, this need not shed any light on DA's validity for us. Our knowledge of the past is conditional only on such comparatively uncontroversial assumptions as that archaeology and radiocarbon-dating uncover real traces of the past and not experimental artefacts. Supporters of DA can equally "believe that empirical methods (e.g. radiometric dating of fossils) are completely apt for discerning the age of the human race", (Chambers, p. 447).
Chambers imagines some future theory undercutting DA and so restoring evidential parity between DA and UC, e.g. that "sufficient cosmological data will ultimately rule out 'Doom Soon' possibilities", (Chambers, p. 447). Presumably, he has in mind something like the 'Final Anthropic Principle', i.e. "Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out". 9 It isn't clear how far present applications of DA are threatened by the prospect of such hypothetical future theories. To undercut DA, the necessity of human survival would have to be established but even the Final Anthropic Principle only claims that life's survival is necessary. Having baptised anthropic reasoning, Carter cautioned against its anthropocentric use: "The same selfselection principle would be applicable by any extra-terrestrial civilisation that may exist", (Carter, p. 348) . 10 Evidential symmetry between DA and UC needs more than hints that life's survival may be necessary; it needs census-returns from the future.
III) A Place in the Sun. DA generalises from our existing evidential basis and does not incite us to discard any portion thereof. DA and UC are not just asymmetrical in terms of evidence but, more importantly, asymmetrical in terms of how they treat evidence. DA does not urge us to choose whichever reference class makes our location most probable, regardless of any violence thereby done to our existing evidential basis. If this were DA's method, DA would scarcely need refuting. Any such evidence-discounting DA is apparently a straw man of Chambers' invention.
However, an Ussherian might say: DA birth-ranks are inferred from defeasible empirical data, whereas Bishop Ussher's population-estimates derive from a revealed text. Furthermore, Ussher's hypothesis can be made compatible with experience. 11
However, anyone who accepts a different revelation could use the same reasoning to support any number of evidence-discounting inferences. Why stop with UC and a Young Earth? Discounting empirical evidence purely so that our location may appear probable can have highly counter-intuitive consequences. Likewise with contriving compatibility between our evidential basis and our test-hypothesis. had other advantages, e.g. restoring Hell to the nadir of (a Copernican) creation.
Swinden judged that only a solar Hell could hold the hundred thousand million (or more) souls who would comprise the total of the damned. Swinden's (10 11 ) damned out-weigh the (6 × 10 9 ) now living. Let's assume the saved are negligible and quantify over observers sub specie aeternitatis. Life is short but damnation eternal. If we should favour our residing in the largest and/or most enduring soul-population, as random souls we're more likely damned in the Sun than alive on Earth. If Hell ever holds (10 11 ) souls, six billion souls now live on Earth, and we aren't sure where we are, our damnation is around 94% probable. 13 (In such cases, we can derive our probabilities directly from the relative sizes of populations. Section 5 considers a probabilistically similar case.) SC can even be made compatible with experience. Maybe: 1) damnation is tolerable until grasped as such, 2) the damned only grasp their situation gradually, or 3) others' apparent toleration of Hell is illusory. However, SC is self-frustrating. If this is Hell, nor am I out of it, many of my empirical beliefs are wrong, (e.g. my belief that people die out of this world). SC may make our location appear probable under one set of descriptors but disregards the associated epistemic violence done to our existing empirical beliefs. SC requires that we have somehow correctly grasped relative population-sizes while being deluded about our location. Any preference Solarians show for our population-beliefs is arbitrary. Likewise, UC requires that generations of scribes have preserved a true history of the world but that all empirical evidence of an ancient Earth is systematically false. Such pervasive deception would imperil almost all empirical data. So, another UC moral: respect the epistemic dimension of test-hypotheses and place more stringent requirements on them than simply demanding that they can be made consistent with experience.
IV) Doomsday Without Birth-Ranks?
Even if Chambers fails to despatch Carter-Leslie DA, UC may threaten some DA offshoots. DA discussions often debate the merits of two different rules for relating probabilities and populations. Some DA supporters invoke a Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA): "Observers should reason as if they were a random sample from the set of all observers in their reference class," (Monton, p. 80). Many DA-critics 13 Prob. (Damned) = Total damned = 10 11 = (100/106) ≈ 94.34% Total (damned + living) 10 11 + (6 × 10 9 ) argue for 'Doom Later' shifts using a counterbalancing 'Self-Indication Assumption' (SIA): "Finding you exist gives you reason to think that there are many observers", (Monton, p. 81). 14 Even if SSA alone yields a 'Doom Soon' probability-shift, applying SIA and SSA yields no overall shift in probabilities conditional on birthranks. SIA seems attractive, not least because it reinforces the intuition that having a certain birth-rank should have no bearing on humanity's longevity.
However, just because SIA undercuts DA it doesn't follow that SIA is unproblematic. SIA makes no reference to birth-ranks and Bostrom argues that using However, Darren Bradley thinks Monton's DA implicitly requires birth-ranks. 16 Monton needs restrictions on admissible properties k because some properties will covertly encode birth-rank data. If we learn "there existed a 500 th President of the United States", (Bradley, p. 96), this will favour H2's larger population. Monton's problem is that the choice of properties must be restricted so that k must be instantiated in the smaller population "otherwise K would shift the probabilities of the hypotheses", (Bradley, p. 97). So, when you learn K, you also know you belong in H1's smaller population and so know your approximate birth-rank.
Invoking UC supports Bradley's conclusion that DA needs birth-rank information and hence that SIA is not demonstrably more plausible than SSA. Even if Monton deflects Bradley's criticism by finding a rank-independent property k, we can make an Ussherian temporal mirror-image of Monton's DA: M has higher likelihood if the past population is small too. Thus, P(MH1) > P(MH2) if H1 and H2 postulate the same number of present humans, but a small and large past humanity respectively.
Monton's DA risks being formally symmetrical between past and future, with the twist that Monton cannot invoke birth-rank data. Using empirical evidence to distinguish between H1 and H2 would disclose our approximate birth-ranks. (Worse, given a property k which is equally likely to be instantiated among the living or the damned, SIA and Monton's argument might support a Solarian Corollary as well.)
The chief objection to UC is that DA needs birth-rank data. Without such evidence, DA is no more compelling than other highly counter-intuitive attempts to make our 16 Chambers claims the 'Urn Model' that yields high probabilities for our having few descendents can also generate a high probability for our having few ancestors. UC fails because it treats two evidentially very different situations (i.e. the past and the future) identically. However, a UC variant might run in the Simulation case, because any numbers for ancestral simulation-levels must needs be speculative. A successorless-level is only a probable location if being successorless is the norm, but that can only be so if no simulation occurs, i.e. only one level exists, bereft of ancestors and successors. This reasoning could be supported with a DA-style indifference-principle, e.g. if L is our maximal total of simulation-levels, our prior probability of occupying a given level equals 1/L. However, all our anti-hierarchy conclusion needs is the weaker assumption that the likelihood of our occupying a given level declines as the total of levels increases. Thus, if you have two hypotheses
A and B about your hierarchy, where A postulates more levels than B, you ought to prefer B, i.e. if your level is number x, P(L x B) > P(L x A). Because this argument issues in a likelihood-ratio, it requires neither priors, exact numerical likelihoods nor indifference principles. That the likelihood of our occupying a given level declines as the total of levels rises is not an a priori claim but an empirically-driven assignment of likelihoods based on Bostrom's assumption that simulation costs increase with the total of levels simulated: "One consideration that counts against the multi-level hypothesis is that the computational cost for the basement-level simulators might be prohibitively great", (2003, p. 253 ).
Suppose we consider a more complicated simulation-hierarchy than a straightforward linear chain of simulation-levels. What if hierarchies can branch?
Then we potentially have to consider our location qua observer, Sim-level or Simworld. In a branching hierarchy, each level may run many simulated worlds, each world in turn containing many Sims. However, our likelihood-ratio argument can apply to this case too. All we need assume is that our chances of occupying a given simulated world will decline as the overall number of worlds rises. Again, this assignment of likelihoods follows from an economy assumption about the simulation process, i.e. simulation costs are proportional to the number of worlds simulated as well as the number of levels in our hierarchy. Thus, besides the vertical 'few ancestors' UC, we can also run a horizontal 'few contemporaries' UC against the hypothesis that this world is but one of many simulated worlds. As with any numbers for our simulating ancestral levels, any numbers for our simulated contemporary worlds must be speculative. UC only applies where we are not invited to discount any of our existing empirical basis, and UC fails against standard birth-rank DA. all else being equal, we shouldn't assume we live in a Sim-hierarchy. In this (unusual) case, we can reasonably favour 'few ancestors' and 'few contemporaries' hypotheses, because we have no empirical evidence that any ancestral levels or contemporary simulated worlds exist and, if such exist, our location is unlikely.
A common objection to Doomsday, Ussherian, Solarian and Simulation arguments might run thus: choice of reference class is not a purely logical matter but can be assessed (at least partly) by the success of its applications and its coherence with background metaphysical and epistemic assumptions. If a given reference class leads to deeply counter-intuitive conclusions, discounts existing empirical evidence or requires controversial metaphysical assumptions, we have good reason for at least scrutinising that reference class. Of the four arguments above, only DA uses a reasonably robust reference class that squares with our background evidence and general epistemic assumptions. DA at least projects from plausible assumptions to a conclusion that fits with our existing beliefs and inductive strategies.
Contra DA, Chambers (p. 447) protests that he can't be considered a random human because his birth-rank must exceed his father's, whereas a truly random draw would give the same probability to his preceding his father and to his father preceding him. Inevitably, Chambers' birth-rank will receive different probabilities if he considers himself qua random human or qua his father's son. Like any probabilistic argument, DA's conclusion can change with the reference class under which its explanandum is considered. Trying to establish which reference classes are truly salient is beyond this paper's scope but for many purposes the 'random human' reference class seems more salient than (e.g.) the 'random carbon-based object' reference class. However, DA assumes that the 'human' reference class is not only salient now but is salient throughout history. It isn't clear that this reference class is enduringly salient, nor that its synchronic identity-or boundary-conditions are unproblematic.
Seemingly, what makes a reference-class salient (or not) is its mapping of causalnomological structures or significant patterns of co-occurring properties. Grouping red objects into one reference class makes sense for certain purposes because they all share some causal (e.g. optical) properties in common. Likewise, electrons make a truly robust reference-class because (we hypothesise) all electrons possess certain shared causal/nomological features, e.g. all electrons co-instantiate the same charge and the same (rest) mass. Considering the physiological and cognitive factors that shape human identity and self-awareness, we might well wonder if the set of all humans (past, present and future) forms a truly salient reference class in the way that the set of electrons might. Likewise, Sims and non-Sims need not occupy the same reference class even if they are internally experientially indistinguishable. The situations of Sims in simulated worlds and non-Sims in unsimulated worlds will reflect different nomological structures and support different counterfactual inferences. Rationality does not demand that we treat the 'human' reference class as enduringly salient or that the same reference class covers Sims and non-Sims.
Genuinely salient reference classes map robust causal and/or nomological properties but the above arguments offer conclusions no more salient or robust than their contrived reference classes. Unless or until a truly robust procedure for choosing reference-classes is forthcoming, we can remain unmoved by Doomsday arguments. 
